

The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

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3 October 1983

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : David Y. McManis
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

SUBJECT : Monthly Warning and Forecast Meetings
for September

1. The reports on the NIO warning meetings are attached.
2. The warning highlights of the meetings conducted by NIO's during September follow.

a. INF

(1) There is no new evidence to indicate steps underway by the Soviets to ~~improve~~ U.S. in an "analogous position." [redacted]

[redacted] Unless the Soviets contemplate reducing their SS-20 force drastically, they probably are resigned that NATO will deploy its INF. Thus, one of their principal objectives is to make the deployment as politically costly to West Europeans and the U.S. as possible. The general effectiveness of the U.S. response to the KAL shootdown may well make the Soviets more intent on targeting the Reagan Administration and thus toughen whatever countermeasures they plan against INF.

(2) West Germany remains the focus for the largest demonstrations in October as INF deployment nears. Red Army faction and other fringe groups plan disruptive actions. Some Green elements promise a more active interpretation of "civil disobedience." Large demonstrations are also likely in the U.K. during October but the public seems resigned to deployment. In Italy, "autonomous groups" are urging provocative actions at Comiso and violence is possible.

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b. Lebanon

(1) The ceasefire continues to hold, but inconclusive political negotiations will probably be followed by more fighting. Over the next six months, a de facto partition will continue as the Amin government's support will diminish and narrow. If there is no meaningful progress toward forming a government of national unity, the Lebanese Army will become more dependent on the U.S., and we will encounter growing problems with our regional allies in securing transit rights to resupply the Army. There is risk of a deterioration into a direct U.S.-Syrian military confrontation. If that occurs, Syria will look to the USSR for support. There is little prospect of Arab support for the U.S. position in such a confrontation.

c. Iran-Iraq War

(1) Iran's strategy of attrition is increasing Iraq's desperation and raising the possibility of Iraqi escalation of the conflict. Some escalation--most likely Iraqi attacks on tankers transiting to and from Iranian ports--seems inevitable, with or without the use of Super Entendard aircraft.

d. Pakistan

(1) The unrest in Sind Province continues but it has not spread to the politically critical Punjab Province. Analysts generally agree that Zia will remain in power for the next six months, although his position may be eroded.

e. El Salvador

(1) Talks between Ambassador Stone's mission and guerrilla factions emphasized several points. First, the guerrillas said that they are not interested in participating in elections. They displayed confidence in winning the war on the ground despite recent successful government operations. The motives of the guerrillas seem to be to deal with the El Salvador Peace Commission to make it appear as if they are dealing with the government and to appeal directly to the U.S. Congress in a context of reasonableness. The talks also make differences among the guerrilla factions apparent and an argument can be made that

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force has caused negotiations to be possible. Human rights continues to be a problem affecting U.S. Congressional attitudes.

f. Sudan

(1) Growing shortages, a decline in the standard of living, and discontent in the military force present Nimeiri with new challenges. Nimeiri has reaffirmed the primacy of Islamic law; he has probably further antagonized the non-Muslim south. Problems will be compounded by Ethiopian and Libyan supported dissidents and the weakened Nimeiri regime should be watched closely in the coming months.

g. Chad

(1) Habre can retain control over the southern part of Chad with French support. Prospects are for a long-term French presence before an accommodation can be arranged.

h. Angola

(1) Much of the Soviet equipment delivered during recent months is beyond Angola's abilities to operate effectively. The Community is looking for evidence of increased Soviet, Cuban, or East European personnel strengths to maintain and operate the equipment.

i. Philippines

(1) The Marcos government has made no serious attempt to diffuse the political situation. The financial situation is precarious and concern also centers on the reaction of U.S. and Japanese banks. President Reagan's visit could be the focus of further violent demonstrations.

j. Greece

(1) Pressures from the left are likely to cause Papandreou to move left on foreign policy issues further complicating relations with the U.S. Withdrawing permission to use Greek facilities for resupply of the Lebanese armed forces is but one example. U.S. bases in Greece, after the initial five-year term, will be an issue in the 1985 elections and a destabilizing element in U.S.-Greek relations.

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David Y. McManis

Attachments:

SA/W
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NIO/EA
NIO/LA
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